(De-)Linking Arabic-Islamic Poetics in Contemporary Literary Theory:
Reclaiming Enunciation

Muhamad Abdelmageed*

Introduction

Traditional scholarship on literary theory tends to ingrain an impression that the idea of ‘theory’ is mostly-western rooted in a conceptual tradition that stretches from Plato to Jacques Derrida or Slavoj Žižek. Despite the suspicion of eurocentricity that colored the early reception of literary theory and criticism in the global south (e.g., Subhi et al. 1972; Spivak [1979] 1996; Seed 1991), including Egypt (e.g., Badawi 1984; Ayyad 1993), the centrality of western philosophers and literary theorists, such as Martin Heidegger, Roland Barthes, Derrida or Fredric Jameson, is persistently affirmed by the thousands of pages produced every year dedicated to notions of “literariness,” “textuality” or “genre” from a dominantly western viewpoint—“the vantage point of Europe, or the West” in Edward Said’s parlance (1985, 22).

Decades after Said’s momentous Orientalism, the final death blow to eurocentrism in ‘theory’ has not been dealt yet—and it may never be unless theory in its present form is unlearnt, as the paper argues eventually. The lack of a consistently meaningful, institutional engagement in continental Europe with theories of postcoloniality and decoloniality in varying degrees for decades could be one notable reason, as noted by Huguet (2015, 93-113), and Gallien (2020, 44-48). The oscillation between rewesternizing or dewesternizing knowledge in some corners of the global south coupled with the neoliberal structural reform subordinating the humanities to STEM may stand to blame for thwarting the consolidations of initiatives aiming at decolonizing the humanities.\(^1\) The decades of postcolonial questioning to eurocentrism in its myriad formulations, in other words, have arguably failed in effecting a rupture with the epistemological hegemony of the west in the humanities, in general, and in literary theory, in specific. Unthinking the colonial matrix of power (CMP) across the underfunded human sciences, whether in the global north or Global South, may prove to be the most formidable hurdle in challenging the hold of eurocentrism as this paper posits in the specific context of Arabic-Islamic poetics. Spearheading the four conceptual domains underlying

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* Assistant Lecturer of Critical and Literary Theory in the Department of English Language and Literature, Faculty of Arts, Cairo University. This paper is derived from his Ph.D. thesis in-progress, entitled “Squaring the Hermeneutic Circle: A Decolonial Approach to the Arab-Islamic Dialectical Tradition” (Cairo University), supervised by Prof. Omaima Abou-bakr, Prof. Loubna Youssef, and Prof. Ragaa Ahmad Aly.

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western coloniality of power, namely: knowledge/understanding, governance/legal authority, economy, and human/humanity (Mignolo 2021, 36-37), knowledge/understanding in literary theory preserves a marginal place for Arabic-Islamic literary theories from the eighth century onwards.

Contemporary literary theory, to postcolonial theorists’ credit at least, is no longer universally dealt with in disjunction from postcolonial theories. Terry Eagleton’s Literary Theory: An Introduction ([1983] 1996), as an example, introduces postcolonial theory in a footnote by the second edition of his book (216). Since the 1990s, readers, textbooks and scholarship on theory have been featuring a canonical postcolonial corpus that includes Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha ever since (Newton 1997; Bennet and Royle 2004; Habib 2005, 2011; Pelagia 2015; Castro Varela and Dhawan 2015). More troubling, postcolonial criticism has, debatably, normalized a mode of controlled questioning of the legacies of colonialism that is insulated from the theoretical philosophical, aesthetical underpinnings of the body of literary theory. This mode of questioning approaches postcoloniality as a conceptual artefact or as a mere textual philosophy, a sordid actuality that has undermined the potential of postcolonial criticism to (re)read theory in its entirety or reframe the human sciences beyond the shackles of Euro/American-centrism and western-style grand narratives of modernity. This quintessential textuality of postcolonial criticism is captured by Deepika Bahri (2006) in her attack on readings of ‘hybridity’ among postcolonial critics in Southeast Asia and affirmed by Bill Ashcroft’s (2015) note on the nature of ‘postcolonial theory’ and the context that surrounds postcolonial studies proliferation at the end of the twentieth century. “[T]he confinements of the concerns of the theory of hybridity to semiotic terrain,” Bahri (2006, 6) cautions, “is not without cost to our understanding of the material, historical, and racial coordinates of the colonial experience, the specificity of trauma and loss, and the struggle for power and justice.” What Bahri admonishes in the postcolonial theorizing of ‘hybridity’ is arguably applicable to the textual aspects of the postcolonial reading codes with the notable exception of Deleuzian postcolonialism. As Ashcroft reminds us, the supra-ontological postcolonial theory could be described as the “branch of contemporary theory that investigates and develops prepositions about the cultural and political impact of European conquest upon colonized societies and the nature of those societies’ responses” (2015, 235). Ashcroft further adds that postcolonial studies proliferation is predicated on its ability to provide an analytical framework for a myriad cluster of cultural phenomena (236).

In terms of Arabic-Islamic poetics between the eighth and nineteenth century in the body of ‘theory,’ the glaring absence in theory handbooks and the myopic focus on the ‘classical’ Arabic-Islamic philosophical poetics is a reminder that the decolonial option of delinking from the current regime of knowledge is hard pressing. When comparativists point out the pervasive eurocentrism in literary anthologies, readers and textbooks, such as Rebecca Gould (2011, 167-186), editors of anthologies, as in the cases of Richard Lane’s Global Literary Theory (2013) and Vincent B. Leitch et al. of The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism (2018),
continue to avoid exploring the vast material contributions of Arabic and Muslim philosophers and literary theorists to scholarship, a tendency that extends to other cultures of the Global South beyond South Asia and South America in varying degrees. When other disciplines seem to have fared better in questioning its eurocentric foundations, such as history or the social sciences (Gould 2011, 167), some leading Euro-American specialists in Arabic philosophy who are conscious of the heavy legacy of orientalists on their discipline are still divided into whether rhetoric, poetics and language belong to the study of philosophy or not as in the case of Dimitri Gutas (2018, 20). As Robert Gassmann et al. (2018, 3) emphasize, despite the arduous endeavor in many corners of western academia to study non-European philosophies, paradigm shifts that draw a line between western conceptualization of philosophy and the non-European ones have not taken place yet. This example of the coloniality of form attests to the limitations of the postcolonial à la Ashcroft in juxtaposition with the decolonial prioritization of decolonizing the coloniality of being and knowing.

This preliminary investigation is divided into three major sections: the ‘colonial’ in ‘theory,’ the decolonial challenge to literary theory, and reclaiming enunciation in the study of Arabic-Islamic poetics. Given the sheer breadth of attempting to detail the colonial in ‘theory,’ this paper advances a decolonial critique of the western epistemics undergirding ‘theory’ in the established postcolonial, theoretical stance on the entwinement of theory, history, and eurocentrism as per Robert Young (2004), then proceeds with a close examination of the handful accounts of Arab-Islamic literary theories in anthologies and readers of literary theory (Hamarneh 1994; Habib 2011; Harb 2020a, 2020b), while outlining a decolonial trajectory for unthinking the colonial in (de)linking Arabic-Islamic poetics within theory.

The ‘Colonial’ in ‘Theory’

Robert Young, as the curtains were finally drawn on the long twentieth century, explicitly paints—and rightly he does—“literary and cultural history” (2004, xi-xii) as accomplices to European colonialism and the hegemonic conditions permeating the institutionalized machinations of knowledge production. Acknowledging his situatedness within the myriad strands of Anglo-American poststructuralisms and continental Marxisms, Young advances a metacritique of ‘History’ as totalized construct that produces significations by incorporating a host of “ethico-political concepts, such as ‘progress,’ ‘human freedom,’ ‘necessity’ and the like” (54). In his assessment, theorists, such as Michel Foucault, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and A. J. Gremias among others, have all recognized the preeminent significance of reflecting on “the historicity of historical understanding” in their theorizations (54, 224). The actual point of contention in relation to studying the theoretical problematic of history is, he adds, “what kind of history, and…what status can be accorded to historical thought” (2004, 55). Not only is conflating “human history” with “history of the West” ethnocentric and eurocentric—as acknowledged by Claude Lévi-Strauss in his critique of Jean-Paul Sartre, but also it speaks of the mythical foundations of time as an analytical category devised by modern ‘Man’ (Young
By foregrounding Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist attack on Sartre’s brand of Marxist historicism, Young effectively re-orient the genesis of cultural and literary theory’s attack on the ethnocentrism of western historicism to the late structuralism of Lévi-Strauss, and eventually, Althusser, Michel Foucault, and the Marxist poststructuralism of Fredric Jameson. Simultaneously, the critique of ‘History’ as a singularity and ‘Man’ as a politicized product of European humanism by Althusser, among others, is portrayed at once as the common ground that is contested by anti-humanists, along with leading postcolonial intellectuals such as Aimé Césaire and Franz Fanon (Young 2004, 158-161).

Deconstructive as he is of the western paradoxical conceptualizations of history from Sartre to Foucault—specifically, history as “both totalizing and detotalizing, essentialist and non-essentialist” (2004, 120), Young extends his poststructuralist problematization of history and historicism into the postcolonial theories of Edward Said, Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak in the last one third of White Mythologies. History, as understood from Young’s account, is the terrain that is primarily negotiated by anti-colonialist critiques in contestation to the marginality of colonialism in European culture—a contestation that radically aims to restructure European thought, in general, and its historiography, in specific (158). In his postcolonial reflexive theorization, Young faults Said’s Orientalism for failing to historicize humanism while appealing to several of its ideals, that is, Said’s humanist appeal to a shared human history and experience against the evils of Orientalist reality is carried out in opposition to humanism which is implicated in the production of the anti-humanist Orientalism Said is dissecting (2004, 170-71). “Said’s difficulty,” Young points out, “is that his ethical and theoretical values are all so deeply involved in the history of the culture he criticizes, that they undermine his claims for the possibility of the individual being in a position to choose, in an uncomplicated process of separation, to be inside and outside his or her own culture” (172). Said’s invocation of a ‘critical consciousness’ that is destined to be colored by the reigning ideological forces in a given culture does not square with the possibility Said claims to exist for the intellectual. In Young’s appraisal, Said’s emphasis on human agency in the Foucauldian schemas he applies to ‘Orientalism’ neither undo the conflictual opposition between free will and the structures of cultures nor unravel the dualisms of Orientalist thinking (177). Said’s postcolonial critique, in general, seems to be oblivious to the historicity of its own cultural hermeneutic—a limitation that has been shaped by Said’s positionality in western academia and his belief in an unquestioned set of humanist ideals. Young finds in Homi Bhabha’s psychoanalytic, postcolonial hermeneutic a marked shift in method and politics that further contests the traditional, western regimes of historical knowledge in novel ways.

Used by Bhabha to problematize the ambivalent constitution of the colonial stereotype in the discourse of colonialism, “fetishism,” in Young’s analysis, embodies one of these dehistoricized concepts within Bhabha’s discourse that brings to the foreground the issue of employing psychoanalysis to understand colonialism historically (2004, 184). The term “fetish” could be seen used in Marx’s Capital to
reference the objects revered by African natives for spiritual reasons, then it reappears in Freud’s psychoanalysis in his theorization of sexuality (Young 2004, 184). Young contends that Bhabha’s emphasis on the ambivalence of the colonial situation seems to correlate with a disavowal of historicization, which “marks the very basis of the Europeanizing claims he [Bhabha] is trying to invert” (2004, 187). In relying on psychoanalysis to fathom the colonial condition, Young finds in Bhabha’s a validation of Deleuze and Guattari’s characterization of psychoanalysis in the colonial situation and, more importantly, a continuation of Fanon’s precedent in the latter’s Black Skin, White Masks (184, 194). Unlike the space Young reserves for Fanon in his analysis, Deleuze and Guattari’s reference happens in passing to introduce a justification by which western psychoanalysis could be utilized to examine the colonial condition (2004, 184).  

The rationale for Bhabha’s reliance on psychoanalysis could be located in his introduction to Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks (Bhabha, [1986] 2008, xxi-xxxvii). Bhabha holds that the perversions of colonial governance with its normalization of violence and racial hatred are what compels Fanon to “put the psychoanalytic question of desire to the historic condition of the colonial man” ([1986] 2008, xxvii). This racial hatred that splits the self and subverts the normative mythology of ‘Man’ is reminiscent of Fanon’s theory of Manichean dichotomy, which posits “white and black represent two poles of a world…in perpetual conflict” consciousness (Fanon 1967, 31). In this same vein, Young strongly suggests that Fanon’s Manicheanism had an influence on Bhabha’s stereotype and notion of ambivalence (Young 2004, 194).

Reading the history of colonialism psychoanalytically may have started with Fanon, yet it has arguably cemented its position among postcolonial critics with Bhabha’s critique (Greedharry 2008, 4-5). In White Mythologies, Young seemingly refuses to commit himself to a final position on the politics and trajectory of Bhabha’s critique, meeting Bhabha’s signature commitment to undecidability with its suitable match (2004, 195-198). On the larger question of history, he praises Bhabha for his subversivist reading that shifts the ground from “the dominant Western paradigm of historicist narrative, temporality, and univocality,” acknowledging the newly acquired attention the production of historical knowledge at the hands of investigators and historians has garnered (2004, 198). Accounting for the psychosocial ramifications of colonialism on the colonized/colonizer may be one of the lasting legacies of postcolonial, psychoanalytical critics; nonetheless, it could hardly account for the multifaceted socioeconomic, ecological, political, or epistemic impacts of colonialism or/and imperialism that continue to the present day. Spivak’s critique, to begin with, problematizes some aspects of Bhabha’s psychoanalytical historiography from an analogous vantage point that foregrounds the intersections of knowledge production, and subject constitution. Her focus on “subaltern history,” emphasis on the narrativity and representationality of colonial history and urge to utilize the tools of literary analysis, as recounted by Young (2004, 200-201), is one point of dissention from Bhabha’s predominantly psychoanalytical approach.

Even though Spivak’s approach is emphasized by Young as a continuation of Bhabha’s interest in counter-narratives as sites of subject constitution (2004, 203),
Spivak’s interest in archives, emerging from her collaboration with the Subaltern Studies group, is quite different from Bhabha’s. This implies that early Spivak may have represented a strand of postcolonial literary theory which may have had an anchor in the materiality of archives on the contrary of Bahri’s objection (2006, 6). Bahri’s attack is still relevant to Bhabha whose historiography recalls and reproduces the transcendental categories of western psychoanalysis into the colonial situation—such as nachträglichkeit [deferred action] in discussing the retroactive return of subaltern agency within narratives to effect closure (Bhabha 1994, 261-266). Archives is the site where “evidence” is produced, identities are constructed and notions of Other-ness are consolidated (“Subaltern Studies” 1985, 208). A “subaltern against the grain” reading of archives would be Spivak’s way of deconstructing the positivist, humanist claims embedded in archives as repositories of ‘facts’ (“The Rani” 1985, 248-252). Spivak’s hermeneutic is scathingly critical of the positivist foundations of modern western academy, by and large, and literary theory and history, in specific. This emphasis of the early Spivak aligns her with the euphony of critical voices in 1980s and 1990s from the global south who actively sought to decolonize the humanities in their indigenous languages.

Ato Quayson (2012a) posits that postcolonial criticism has failed to offer an adequate account of history that takes into consideration the residues of colonialism and imperialism in our shared temporalities and interwoven spatialities (360-363). For that particular reason, Young’s critical account of history and western historicism in White Mythologies, despite its shortcomings, remains relevant to this day as part of contemporary theory in its western conceptualization and as a cornerstone of postcolonial theorizing. As Young recounts in his second edition, White Mythologies was instrumental in the establishment of ‘postcolonial studies’ as a distinctive field of inquiry that is rooted in “Western radical discourse” informed by “non-Western epistemologies and experience” and the dissident critiques of “non-European theorists” (2004, 1-7). Apart from the problematic questions raised by the prefix “post-” that are usually picked up by postcolonial theories’ detractors (Quayson 2012a and 2012b), Young’s reorientation to the genesis of the field to western Marxism methodologically may look surprisingly similar to Eagleton’s claim that theory in the 1960s and the 1970s sprung as a critique of “classical Marxism” (2003, After Theory 34). Adding further emphasis on the “non-Western epistemologies and experience” shaping the 1960s and 70s “theory,” as Young (2004) does, would not remedy the epistemic ramifications of this theorization. In other words, the forces of globalization, the nature of the canonical colonial discourse of Said, Bhabha and Spivak and the intellectual lineages established by the reliance on poststructuralism may have played a pivotal role in the establishment of the field; nevertheless, they remade the former colonized an object of western theorization and academics based in the West. In White Mythologies, Spivak may stand out for inviting Young to engage with the established Southern epistemological practices of the Subaltern history group. It is to Spivak’s credit that Young engaged with the myriad theoretical underpinnings of her position since she has been persistently vigilant about such an epistemic predicament (Spivak “Translator’s
Preface” 1994, 268-286). The example set by Spivak underscores the predicament of western theory which does not systematically engage with the critical input of southern critics unless they are published in a western European tongue or relocated to the global north.

In the long-understudied, contemporary Arabic-speaking academia, the early reception of literary theory underscores an awareness of the disconnect between the western-imported, jargon-laden literary forms and the realities of the anticolonial struggle against European colonialism in the global south. In the third Arab Writers conference in Cairo, Suhair al-Qalamawi (1958, 17-19), the pioneer Egyptian feminist and specialist in Arabic literature, levels a scathing critique of some of her contemporary nahda intellectuals who celebrate humanism and the commonalities among humans in contrast to the dehumanizing reality of colonialism subduing many countries in the east. Conscious of the undesirable responses this uncritical adoption of foreign forms and discourses among nahḍawiyyin, al-Qalamawi (1958, 17-18) quickly points to the cultural backlash against the aforementioned attitude inherent in the conservative calls to defend Arabic as both the liturgical language and the thread that holds the Arab World together without any recourse to western theory. Al-Qalamawi (1958, 19) concludes her argument by calling upon literary critics, in specific, to draw upon the sixteen-hundred-year-old Arabic literary tradition and to rise to the serious challenges their realities pose. Whereas al-Qalamawi’s position seems to be preliminarily preoccupied with the cultural differences between ‘third-world countries’ and the western colonial powers and appreciative of the breadth of the Arabic understudied tradition—at least in the aforementioned text, it marks the presence of an epistemic discomfort with the universalizing aspects of western theory demonstrated in her clear rejection of the absolute applicability of theory on third-world or Arabic texts. In his turn and few decades later, Ihsan Abbas (1972, 5-15), the literary critic and historian, expresses his serious concern with the late 1960s and early 1970s broader trend of faulting old Arabic criticism [al-naqd al-qadīm] for its theoretical and methodical misgivings as opposed to contemporary western literary criticism. Nahḍawi (mis-)readings, in Abbas’s (1972, 5-9, 14) assessment, have uncharitably problematized issues, such as: an alleged universal lack of unity in old Arabic poems, a perceived formalist bias towards poetry over prose, a suspected dearth of analytical, applied strands of criticism and an anti-realist foundation based on an idealism that has probably been shaped by either the predominant religious, philosophical or moral idealism(s).

Having produced an exceptional work of early Arabic literary history a year earlier—namely Tārīkh al-naqd al-ʻadabī ʻinda al-ʻArab (1971), Abbas (1972, 5-10) produces an apology of old Arabic criticism that is driven by the premise that modern age science is epistemically different from the age of al-naqd al-‘Arabi al-qadīm since the latter has been chiefly modeled after the reigning sciences of language, grammar, logic, jurisprudence and metaphysics. Abbas, therefore, rejects the ahistorical nahḍawi (mis-)readings that veer from the historically-grounded epistemic contexts of Arabic criticism, while fielding the following objections among others. The fascination with the poetic form and the rhyme scheme has been
a cultural peculiarity of Arabs comparable with the peculiar cultural preferences of other nations. As for the issue of organic unity, Abū ‘Alī Muḥammad al-Ḥātimī (d. 338/998) who argued for the preservation of unity in poetry likened to the unity of organs in the human body speaks to the contrary of what such readings posit. Al-Ḥātimī is also taken to epitomize the bands of applied critics who existed in the Arabic culture yet failed to effect a notable change in issues such as the organic unity of poems. Apart from the cases of literary theft, Abbas (1972, 8) acknowledges the lack of Arabic analytical studies that examine poems in relation to wider wholes. As he puts it earlier, criticism would not arise in any nation without the applied criticism besides theoretical criticism; nonetheless, a host of circumstances effects the productive reception of either the theoretical or the applied critical strands of a tradition that should be taken into account. Abbas (1972, 14) only concedes that idealism was markedly predominant in Arabic culture as part of the overarching cultural norms until Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1332) legitimized and normalized a historical, fact-based mode of criticism that is culturally sensitive to the specificities of each community. Abbas’ foundational critique demonstrates how opposition to the earlier nahḍawī fascination with western literary methods developed a more critical reception of literary theory and the entailed premise of western conceptual superiority over Arabs or Muslims. More crucially, this opposition assumed the character of an epistemic historical reconstruction of the learned, scholarly Arabic-Islamic traditions spanning centuries, disciplines, and geographical swathes of land.

With the growing proliferation of literary theory in the Arab World through translation, movement of scholars into the global north and the cross-cultural interaction in conferences and symposia, the Arabic balāghahī tradition attracted further scholarly interest from some leading critics and intellectuals searching for an Arabic theoretical foundation that anchors their critiques in the Arabic-Islamic tradition against the evolved western literary canon within the larger western-styled humanities. Since Muhammad Ṭāhir al-Qāhir al-Muḥammad M. al-Shiqqī al-Turkuzī edited Asrār al-balāgha and Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz for the first time between 1902 and 1904 and Abd al-Rahman Badawi (1961, 85-90) brought attention to al-Qarṭājannī’s Minhāj al-bulagāʾ, the poetical theorizations of both ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078?) and Ḥāzim al-Qarṭājannī (d. 648/1285) have been arguably dominating this reconstructive endeavor to appraise the theoretical and practical critical heights Arab-Muslims critics reached prior to the reception of western theory. Kamal Abu Deeb (1979, 10-47; 1990, 387), for instance, approached Jurjānī as a western modern literary theorist who is on a par with new critics in the stature of I. A. Richards and T. S. Eliot and literary theorists such as Roman Jakobson. Al-Jurjānī, for Abu Deeb (1990, 379-387), redefined notions as meaning, words, poetic imagery, deviated from the Aristotelian conceptualization of metaphor, and yet his approach is structuralist—a position that has been lambasted by Nasr Abu Zayd (1984), Gaber Asfour (1991) and Abdel-Aziz Hammouda (2001). In contrast to Abu Deeb’s modernizing project of turāth, N. Abu Zayd (1984, 11-24) advocated a metacritical approach towards Jurjānī through which the interpreter attempts to use Jurjānī’s hermeneutic in appraising tradition against Jurjānī’s own poetics. Abu Zayd (1984)
specifically departs from the premise that if Jurjānī himself attempted to deconstruct and reconstruct aspects of the prior linguistic tradition to him, it is hermeneutically valid to deconstruct his views and reconstruct his notion of “style” without forcing contemporary theory on Jurjānī’s theorization. In Abu Zayd’s final assessment, Jurjānī’s nazm could not be a general literary theory and it is not required to be so.

While the criticism directed towards coloniality and western hegemony is muted in the briefly survey accounts, Hammouda (1998, 2001) rejected western modernism and its aftermath, establishing a direct lineage between western hegemony and the suppression of local cultures and theories. Adopting western modernity, Hammouda (2001, 9, 185-6) particularly asserts, is the path to an entrenched cultural dependency on the west that blocks reconstructing old Arabic critical and rhetorical theories. In his rejection, Hammouda heralds a critical trend among Arab intellectuals who have resisted assigning any value judgement to the term implying the superiority of the modern over the old antiquated, stretching from Muhammad Mustafa Badawi (1984, 104) to Radwa Ashour (1999, 13-14). In voicing his epistemic discomfort against the uncritical celebration of modernity among some circles of Arab intellectuals, Hammouda’s position is as much similar to Ashour’s (1999) as usually noted, since Ashour (1999, 10) describes these same trends as self-orientalizing. While Ashour (1999) negotiates indigenous modernity in her examination of Fāris al-Shidyāq (1804-87), Hammouda (2001) seeks to uncover an Arabic literary and critical theory in the tradition from al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868?) to Qarṭājannī. Setting aside the culturally alien terminology of western theory in studying this tradition, he (2001, 376, 392), in his reconstructive act of Arabic theory, appeals to western critical notions, such as ‘the unsaid’ and ‘supplement,’ in order to exhaust the hermeneutical potential of al-Jurjānī’s theory in the leadup to al-Qarṭājannī. Arabic balāgha, he (330) contends, reached its zenith in the theorization of al-Qarṭājannī’s. The corners of the seventh/thirteenth century scholar’s theory, Hammouda (2001, 434-6) posits, lies in his conceptualization of poetry, poeticality and aesthetics of jamāl wa-qubḥ, which draws on the linguistic and philosophical systems of Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), and Jurjānī, among others. In sum, these aforementioned three positions, as articulated by Abu Deeb, Abu Zayd and Hammouda, reflect how theory exerted a pull towards westernizing the Arabic-Islamic tradition in some cases, also elicited a rejection of western theory in some others and inspired an embrace of a hermeneutical balancing act between the tradition in its context(s) and the pressures of contemporary theory.

The unavoidable questions, here, would be as follows: to what extent grounding anti-colonial theorizing in western radical discourse would be an instance of “epistemological imperialism” where the non-western theorist is cast as a consumer of western theory? How could the postcolonial critic generalize from the specific colonial situation of the Indian Subcontinent where archives thrived until independence compared with the Arab World whose manuscripts and libraries were largely looted by the Ottomans, Ottoman-era corrupt officials and drained by the European nineteenth-century manuscript collectors—a situation masterfully constructed by Ahmad El Shamsy in his recent monograph (2020). If theory draws upon the real intellectual and material struggles of people around the world, why the
pool of texts and theories chosen is constrained by the founding theorists of postcolonialism or the anticolonial struggles in certain locations with the exclusion of others? As Patrick Colm Hogan (1996) has forcefully argued, the ethnocentrism of literary theory masks an unreal notion that “abstract reflection must have its source and impetus west of the Black Sea and north of the Mediterranean” (2). An ethnocentrism superseded by selective geography of theory in the South risks replicating the same ills anticolonial theorists have reeled against since the 1950s. Postcolonial critiques as that of Young (2004) or Spivak’s ([1985] 1996) own the credit for breaking the silence on this pervasive ethnocentrism in literary history and theory in the western academy. However, by privileging western epistemologies and ontologies, they become actively complicit in the epistemic violence inflicted upon epistemologies of the South by theory at large. As a consequence, the corpus of contemporary literary theory may remain for a while predominantly Euro-American and restrictive in its coverage of Southern critics as opposed to the materiality of the richer and more nuanced theories past and present in the Arab World, as briefly touched upon, or in Latin America as the next section delves into.

Postcolonial criticism slowly became part of the literary theory establishment as evidenced by how anthologists have incorporated its founding texts into the corpus of theory. The foothold gained by postcolonial theories into the body of theory remains unreflective of the rich critical and literary histories of Southern populations. The exceptional anthologies that dedicate a space to a host of, uncanonical, non-Western postcolonial critics, such as Richard Lane’s globalist anthology (2013), are limited by their twentieth century focus. As opposed to J. Rivkin and M. Ryan’s reader (2004, 1071-1229), the field of global studies which debatably shaped Lane’s selection of texts seems promising; however, it seems to subscribe to the traditional literary theory eclectic and antithetical stance against literary history. By focusing on the ‘colonial’ mainly and the subsequent history of the globalization experiment, histories of pre-1500, non-Western poetics are made invisible. Historical surveys of theory and criticism are expected to fill in this gap, but reality is far more disappointing. There are those scholars who engage with the geographically adjacent Arabic-Islamic poetics in the context of medieval Latin literary theory (Gillespie 2005, 145-236; M. Habib 2011, 64-66), or in conjunction with other pre-1500 traditions, such as the Chinese among other civilizations in The John Hopkins Guide (Hamarneh 1994, 30-36). It seems that postcolonial critics have succeeded in making visible the Manichean dualisms between the north and south, the hegemony of the western constructs of rationality and history over knowledge systems. However, they have failed praxically in putting Southern epistemologies on equal footing with those of the west.

**The Decolonial Challenge to Literary History**

Writing in the 1990s, the decolonial theorist Walter Mignolo draws a hard line between the emergent postcolonial theory at the time and the premises that came to distinguish the decolonial from the postcolonial (“Colonial” 1993, 120-134). Colonial discourse, Mignolo posits, is deficient in problematizing its loci of
enunciation, that is, the analysis of the founding theorists of postcolonialism is undercut by the “tension between the insertion of the epistemological subject within a disciplinary (or interdisciplinary) context governed by norms and conventions” and the placement of the same understanding subject “in a hermeneutic context in which race, gender, and class compete with and shape the goals of a given disciplinary game” (1993, 127). It follows then that there is arguably no punctum Archimedis in investigating colonial situations since an authorized locus of enunciation is inseparable from the understanding subject’s research agenda, their disciplinary conventions, their audience, and the previous loci of enunciation questioned. As Young demonstrated in White Mythologies, Spivak has been conscious, from early on in her career, of her positionality as South Asian academic in the West whose disciplinarity and institutional privilege are entwined with the politics of knowledge production she is critiquing (2004, 215). Cognizant of this self-reflexive, deconstructive theorization, Mignolo (1993) openly reprimands the privileged, monologic locus of enunciation enacted and performed by Spivak in the name of interrogating colonial discourse (130). Anticipating the distinction Mignolo draws between the postcolonial and decolonial intellectual in The Politics of Decolonial Investigation (2021, 558), the colonial theorist analyst, in the context of the founding theorists in the early 1990s, is cast as being complicit in an intellectual colonization that reproduces cultures and histories of the Third World into categories and concepts that are readily accessible to the West (1993, 130-131). Forging new loci of enunciation that reflect the myriad ways of knowing and understanding entwining the individual and the collective for people of the South is Mignolo’s message that anticipates the consolidation of the emergent decolonial emphasis on epistemic reconstitution and border thinking (Anzaldúa 1987, 187; Mignolo ; 2011, 273-283; 2021, 1-81).

Framed by the Latin American encounter with imperialism, Mignolo (2000, xxv-xxxv; 2007, 459; 2021, 1-81) and Grosfoguel (2007, 211-212) situate the contested western paradigm of knowledge and aesthetics in the longue durée of coloniality/modernity from the fifteenth to the end of the twentieth century. Grosfoguel (2007, 213-215), in specific, traces back the active locus of enunciation in western epistemics to René Descartes’ theory of knowledge. The ‘ego-cogito’-actualized Man is ascribed Godly attributes by which he can produce non-situated, universal knowledge. Reflecting onto-epistemologically on Cartesian reason, Descartes, in Grosfoguel’s characterization (2007, 214), constructs a regime of knowledge by which a bodiless point of view is concealed in notions of absolute Truth and universalities. In other words, this third person, speaking subject, the ‘who’ of the locus of enunciation, is granted an “epistemic location” within the knowledge produced and disseminated, a hidden position that points to the global north and evokes a set of political norms that determine subaltern bodies. Grosfoguel (2007, 214-215) contends that the aforementioned “epistemic strategy” aided and abetted colonial expansion from the sixteenth century onwards and cemented the subordination of non-western knowledge systems to a superior Euro-American one. Decolonizing the existing regime of coloniality, he adds (2007, 215), requires an
epistemology that radically critiques this god-eye perspective. This prescribed remedy brings to the fore a correlation in decolonial thought between imperialism and the dissemination of western epistemology across the globe. “The expansion of Western capitalism,” Mignolo (2002, 59) claims, “implied the expansion of Western epistemology and the industrial revolution, to the theories of the state, to the criticism of both capitalism and the state.” Among the first to argue for this correlation are Enrique Dussel and Aníbal Quijano who made it constitutive of their notions of “geopolitics of knowledge” and “coloniality of power” respectively (Mignolo 2002, 61; Grosfoguel 2007, 213). Western philosophy, in Mignolo’s account of Dussel (2002, 64-70), is severely limited in dealing with the local histories and intellectual traditions on a planetary scale, which underscores the presence of a geopolitical hierarchy of knowledge and calls for “an ethic of liberation.” The counter-epistemology that Mignolo calls for is “border thinking” which centralizes the subaltern perspective and enacts the decolonization project (2002, 71-73). “Border thinking” reinscribes the terminology of Dussel, Robert Bernasconi’s “double bind” and Lucius Outlaw’s deconstruction-reconstruction operation in addressing the modus operandi of African philosophy, while performing a similar function.

In restituting the destituted Southern epistemologies reconstructed through “border thinking,” decoupling the Global South from the “coloniality of power” and the “colonial matrix of power” would be possible (Mignolo 2007, 453-463). Drawing on Quijano’s insight into the totalizing, historical-structural nature of coloniality (Mignolo 2002 81-85; 2021, 1-81; Maldonado-Torres 2002, 32-39; Grosfoguel 2007, 217-219), decolonialists prioritize unmasking the regime of western hegemony that violently permutated the pre-1500 local histories of world civilizations geopolitically, epistemically, economically, linguistically, and theologically. In terms of literary history, the decolonial hermeneutic requires mapping out a longer historical continuum compared with the postcolonial approaches of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (constitution), underscoring the ‘epistemic’ and ‘aesthetic’ violence wrought by the CMP (destitution), and reconstituting the non-western cosmologies epistemically and aesthetically. This triad of movements embodies the “border epistemology” de-linking Southern cosmologies from the dominating western cosmologies encapsulated in the CMP. Having Arabic literary theory in mind, the decolonial approach could explain the silenced presence of Arabic poetics at the borders of the European middle ages. Geopolitically, they belong to a network of traditions that predates the geopolitical reconfiguration of the world starting from the date Spanish ships set sail across the North Atlantic to the western hemisphere. Spanning fourteen centuries at least from the eighth to the twenty-first century (Harb 2020a), Arabic literary theory, in its literary, rhetorical, grammatical, exegetical, aesthetic, theological, and philosophical kernels, has almost no place in anthologies of literary theory as briefly survey in the previous section. The intellectual compartmentalization of the study of Arabic poetics in western academy dissolves its epistemic unity across multiple sites of disciplinary conventions—history, Arabic literature, Middle Eastern studies, near Eastern studies and seldom philosophy. In the next section, de-linking Arabic poetics from the CMP
Reclaiming Enunciation in the Study of Arabic-Islamic Poetics

In spite of the strides taken by postcolonial theorists to critique imperialism and the dominant eurocentrism in literatures, Linda Hutcheson (2003, 13-15), as recent as the first decade of the twenty-first century, is taken aback by the persistence of the teleological model in approaching national literary history among postcolonial critics, scholars of minor literatures, and literature specialists in many decolonized nations. The myth of *telos* in which history marches towards progress and emergence is not alien to contemporary nineteenth-century and early twenty-first century *nahḍa* proponents in the Arab world. Both Rebecca Gould (2011, 169-170) and Lara Harb (2020b) contend that this period witnessed a major shift in defining the scope, nature, and genealogy of literary criticism. While Gould, in specific, contends that revivalist notion of *nahḍa* imparts a rupture with the medieval Arabic literary tradition and a subscription to the medieval-renaissance European narrative of history (2011, 169), the selective survey early in this paper points to the far complex realities of appraising this tradition among contemporary Arab intellectuals. Since the Egyptian University (Cairo University subsequently) started teaching literary criticism under the influence of Ahmad Amin (1886-1954), a sustained interest in bridging the ruptures causes by the centuries of colonial administration and destitution could be detected in the efforts to cognize the Arabic history through attempting to write new literary histories. Taha Ibrahim Ahmad’s *Tarik al-naqd al-adabi ʿnda al-ʿArab* (1937) is an early example that sets the inherent cultural presuppositions in these attempts. Ahmad al-Shayeb (1937, d-y), who authored the preface to this posthumous publication, mentions two major trends of literary criticism that dominate the field. The first trend is a westernizing strand that evaluate Arabic literature in accordance with the rules and conventions they are familiar with through their study of western literatures, while the second is a conservative strand whose formalist focus adopts the critical interests of the elder Arabic literary critics, such as: Qudāmah ibn Jaʿfar (d. 310/932-948?), Ibn Rashīq (d. 456/1063-4?), al-Ḥasan al-ʿAmidi (d. 370/980) and al-Qādī al-Jurjānī (d. 392/1002). Al-Shayeb (1937, d-h), Ahmad Amin’s recognizes the shortcomings of each insular approach and calls for a prioritization of examining literary criticism as a methodical art (the artistic dimension) within the context of its history and genres (the historical dimension). Shayeb’s answer, on one hand, to the earlier dichotomous trends should not be isolated from the wider *nahḍa* context and its repercussions. On the other hand, it marks a concern with enunciation. “The laws of Arabic criticism,” al-Shayeb (1937, h) proposes, “shall emerge from studying its literature and be created out of its properties and distinctive traditions.” “How, in the name of God, would we reverse the conditions and take the features of the foreign literature along with its new arts as goals that challenges this old Arabic literature?,” he adds. Neither Shayeb nor
Ahmad point fingers to coloniality, yet the contrast between ‘what is foreign’ and ‘what is native’ is a subtle reminder of institutional eurocentrism which favors the normative claims of western aesthetics over the subaltern knowledge systems of the colonized and recently decolonized. The recognition of the primary of history in theorizing literariness is significant in challenging the hegemony of theory on the practice of criticism.

The question of enunciation forces a due consideration of literary periodization and the geopolitical constitution of contemporary academic discourses on Arabic poetics. Since the study of Arabic poetics traditionally follows the western division of humanities, it is spread across different disciplines, such as: late antique and medieval philosophy, rhetoric, argumentation, literary criticism, comparative literature—a division that is antithetical to the pre-1500 Arabic-Islamic poetical tradition fed by falsafa (or hikma in the later tradition), nahw, kalām, fiqh al-lugha, tafsīr, munāzara. This preliminary line of questioning would be limited, then, to the broad commonalities. Periodization is, probably, the most consequential in dictating the methods and approaches used in examining the Arabic-Islamic tradition. It is not expected from either Ibn Rashīq, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Jurjānī, ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī to refer to themselves as medieval or critics; nonetheless, they are usually dealt with as such in contemporary scholarship with few exceptions (Harb 2020b, xi). When one may expect anthologies of literary theory and criticism to grapple with the input of any of the abovementioned figures as grounded in the medieval European ages, the opposite happens and the politics of invisibilization continues unabatedly in some cases. Editors of the special volume of The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism on the Middle Ages (Minnis and Johnson 2005, 11), as an example, acknowledge the large critical input from the Islamic and Jewish traditions, along with the entire Slavic literary traditions, and decline to include any chapters on each for logistical considerations. Vincent Gillespie, inside the same volume, recognizes Abu Nasr al-Fārābī’s “Arabic” influence upon Dominicus Gundissalinus’ twelfth-century commentary on poetics, along with Abu al-Walid ibn Rushd’s on Hermann the German’s study of Aristotle poetics and Abu al-Hasan ibn Sīnā on understanding the faculty of imagination (2005, 166-170). Apart from the dual use of ‘Arabic’ and ‘Islamic’ in the same volume without drawing any distinctions between them or asserting their complementariness, Gillespie’s interest in ‘imagination’ within the Arabic philosophical tradition of poetics stems from her engagement with Latin poetics in its flow from the Toledo school of translators to the major centers of Scholastic knowledge of Latin Europe (2005, 169-179). In lapses like this one where the “Arabic” is a cultural resource or a marginal subtext to a centralized European one, the epistemic and aesthetic emphasis of one tradition seems to triumph over the non-western local tradition. When it comes to The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism (2018), the willful omission of non-western theorists from the classical and medieval periods is staggering. Despite the constant flow of critiques between each edition of the anthology (Gould 2011, 174-178; Krishnaswamy 2010, 405), the western character of theory and criticism in The Norton Anthology (2018) seems to be unassailable. The locus of enunciation in this brief example is avowedly western
in constitution. Situating Arabic poetics in the medieval time frame privileges the history of Europe over the local histories of the pre-1500 Arabic-Islamic traditions.

For the presumable lack of a viable alternative temporal frame, other critics and historians of literary theory have no recourse but to engage with Arabic poetics on this ground, including those who are critical of this established periodization (Harb 2020b, xi). In quite a dissimilar engagement to that of Gillespie (2005), M. A. R. Habib (2005, 194-200; 2011, 64-66) recognizes—albeit briefly—the philosophical influence of two icons of the formative Arabic philosophical tradition al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) and Ibn Sinā, along with al-Fārābī’s Andalusian disciple Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), on the late medieval Aristotelianism. In Habib’s account (2011), the scholastic Latin logical pivot to literature and poetry was largely impacted by the Aristotelian Arabic commentaries of this triad of philosophers (64). Habib (2011) proceeds by foregrounding three representative figures of late medieval literary poetics, one of which is Ibn Rushd. Ibn Rushd is said to have advanced an accent on these three aspects: a moral function of poetry that adheres to the truth, a formal emphasis on unity in poetic discourse and a call to take the emotional impact of poetic discourse on the audience into consideration (66). This recent account by Habib (2011) replaces an earlier one (2005, 195-197) that acknowledged the Fārābian taxonomical imprint on the Latin classification of sciences and linked the ‘Islamic’ treatment of poetics as a logical science to the late antique Alexandrian commentators. The space Habib dedicates to discussing the divergences of Ibn Rushd from Aristotle may be helpful in underscoring the originality of Ibn Rushd and his commitment to his Arabic literary tradition (2005, 197-198). Ibn Rushd’s realistic poetic discourse and his interest in audience reception are cast as pioneering precepts that foreshadow the emergence of a similar Romantic sensibility in the Western tradition and T. S. Eliot’s modernist “objective correlative” (198-199). Attempting not to gloss over the religious in Arabic poetics, Habib (2005, 200) underscores the direct influence of Ibn Rushd the jurist on his retreat from the fictional in poetic discourse. What is problematic at the surface level in Habib’s two accounts is that some editorial choices forced him to cut on the extended discussion of Ibn Rushd’s merits as a literary critic and the influence of Fārābī’s Iḥṣā’ al-ʿUlūm on medieval classifications of science. More troubling is the lament expressed in the two texts that Ibn Rushd has no impact on the Islamic East, citing the famed Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī-Ibn Rushd debate on the merits of philosophy (2005, 196; 2011, 65) and the absence of any references to either of the mentioned philosophers’ works in Arabic or in translation as full treatises (2005, 779; 2011, 75). Whereas the first point has been debunked by the intense recent scholarship on the continuities between the formative philosophical tradition and the later one (e.g., Shihadeh 2005, 178; Griffel 2021, 1-21), the second demonstrates the staggering marginality of Arabic-Islamic poetics in contemporary literary theory and dispensability of subaltern local literary histories. At this level of coverage, Habib’s Arabic-Islamic poetics is inclined towards the canonical Arabic only against the background of Aristotle. Neither the Ashʿarī ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, whose theorization is recognized by scholars of Arabic philology and literature as Wolfhart Heinrichs
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(1973, 21) as “the high watermark of Arabic literary theory, nor al-Qarṭājannī who is usually studied what is termed the ‘Arabic Aristotelian tradition’ is mentioned. In the same western tradition of scholarship, Habib pays no heed to continental European scholarship, as represented by Heinrichs (1973), on Arabic poetics. Given that Habib’s background is postcolonial literary criticism and Heinrichs’ is Arabic literature and philology, this hints at the obstruction posed by the western compartmentalization of disciplines in the examination of the Arab-Islamic tradition.

Peter Adamson and Matteo Di Giovanni (2018, 8) have noted that Ibn Rushd’s intellectual legacy, which flourished in the Latin West and among the circles of Judeo-Arabic commentators across Europe, have been eclipsed by the epistemic weight of Ibn Sīnā’s legacy in the Islamic East. This begs the central question of who is the figure Habib (2005, 2011) representing in his account of literary history in these two works: the Andalusian, Arab-Islamic Ibn Rushd, or the Latin Averroes? To what extent the institutional expectations of theory, literary history and comparative literature are involved? How would one characterize the role of the academic marketplace in sanctioning these tendencies as represented by universities and academic publishers? Juxtaposing the frictious relation established between Ibn Rushd and Abū Hamīd al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and the passing mention of Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā with Habib’s extended discussion of Ibn Rushd’s imprint on Latin poetics would provisionally signal a recall of the Latin Averroes, a philosopher who could be gleaned from the Latin commentaries dedicated to his ideas and from the intellectual movement known as Averroism that is arguably loosely based on Ibn Rushd’s ideas (Hasse 2007, 113-136). The Arabic Ibn Rushd, whose reception of Aristotle has been shaped by al-Fārābī quoted multiple times in his commentaries and the technical choices made by the early Syriac translators of Poetics (Gould 2014, 3), is largely absent from Habib’s account. In his discussion of Ibn Rushd’s “un-Aristotelian description” of tragedy and epic (2011, 66), Habib does not seem to draw on the relevant scholarship on Ibn Rushd which breaks with the tradition of faulting Ibn Rushd for replacing tragedy and comedy with hijāʾ [blame] and madīḥ [praise] or for introducing his radical indigenization of Poetics (al-Rubi 1984; Black 1990; Kemal 1991). Habib’s lapses speak volumes of the failures of the institutions of literary theory and comparative literature in the wake of postcolonial criticism. As Gould (2011, 181-183) points out elsewhere, “geographical comprehensiveness” is literary comparativists’ prerogative who should strive to propose a new agenda for decolonizing the field by opening it to non-European archives instead of subscribing to a utopian belief in the power of comparative literature to foster cross-cultural understanding.

Periodization, the eclecticism of literary theory, its restrictive selectivity and the geographical bias of comparative literature constitute an intertwined nexus that implicate the institutions of knowledge production in omissions as the previous example. These same conditions point at the constructedness of literary history and its complicity in silencing subaltern histories and traditions, which has far-reaching pedagogical ramifications that are not the subject of this discussion. Walid Hamarneh’s entry (1994, 31-36) on Arabic poetics, i.e., “Arabic Theory and
Criticisms,” could serve as a counterexample to Habib’s, bringing to the fore the strands of literary history suppressed by the elisions in chronicles of literary theory. Divided in two unequal halves—namely: classical and modern criticism, Hamarneh traces the development of Arabic poetics in a linear fashion that is brought to the brink with the space dedicated to the span of time extending from the late eighth to the early fourteenth century (31-35). At the heart of his account, the philosophical poetic tradition, which includes al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd, culminates in the critical output of Ḥāṣim al-Qarṭājānī (d. 684/1285) whose thought is cast as the juncture between the Arabic Aristotelian tradition and the indigenous literary criticism tradition (34). In addition to this philosophical tradition which is credited for enhancing the abstract qualities of Arabic literary criticism, these traditions are listed as have contributed to the body of classical Arabic criticism: pre-Islamic performative literary conventions, the philological and grammatical critical musings on parody poetic genres and the rationalist theological tradition of the Muʿtazila (30-32). Under the weight of history, Hamarneh shifts to an enumeration of the problems that dominated the critical debates and led to a consolidation of critical genres, such as: old/new leading to al-muwāżzanah [comparison], form and content [al-lafẓ wa-al-maʿna] as related to influence between poets, good/bad cultivating theory of composition [naẓm], poetry/truth nurturing a novel conceptualization of imagination (32-33).

Hamarneh’s meticulous account remained until recently a unique one among guides to literary theory for its relative breadth and extended overview. It shortly introduces several prominent Arabi-Islamic critics from the intertwined traditions of criticism and theory: the philologists and men of letters Abū Bakr al-Sūlī (d. 335/947), Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥātimī, Abū Muḥammad Ibn Wakīʿ al-Tinnīsī (d. 393/1003), Ibn Rashīq (d. 456/1063?); the philosopher of language Ibn Jinnī; the rationalist mutakallim and litterateur al-Jāḥiẓ among many others. The politics of representation that would consider these extensive references as an achievement would be postcolonial since the decolonial compels one to interrogate what underlies the enunciated, which is enunciation proper (Mignolo 2018, 144). The colonial/modern terms of the conversation, or the enunciation itself in Mignolo’s terminology (2018, 143), seems to sanction Hamarneh’s report as long as it subscribes to notions of secularism, cosmopolitanism, the correlation between urbanization and colonial expansion, the decline at the dawn of modernity—an epistemic attitude that is informed by a restrictive selectivity to figures and critical notions. Hamarneh claims that Islam fostered the independence of critics and criticism, but his account seems to imply that Islam had a modicum of influence on Arab-Islamic literary development (30, 32). The contribution of the Ashʿarī theologian and Avicennan commentator Fakr al-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) to the philosophical construct of “poetic syllogism” in his engagement with Ḥāṣim al-Qarṭājānī’s iʿjāz, as an example, is completely absent despite its novelty (Al-Karaki 2018, 127-155). The peak of creative production, in addition, is restrictively portrayed as happening when an indigenous tradition encounters an imported one as in the figure of al-Qarṭājānī or the modern Arab critics Adunis (b. 1930) along with Kamal Abu Deeb (b. 1942).
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(34-35). Eighth-century Islamic empire engaged in a “civilizing process” that witnessed the dwindling of Bedouins and the explosion of “multiethnic and multicultural” urban centers (31). Bedouins who embodied the role of the cultural and linguistic reservoir of the Arabic culture are denied agency and getting narrated within a narrative that tests the limitations of literary and intellectual history.

In contrast with Hamarneh’s limited account, Lara Harb’s authoritative survey (2020b) attempts, in substance and not in name, a decolonization of Arabic poetics within literary theory. It relatively dewesternizes the activity of mapping the Arabic tradition, which could be repurposed to delink from the colonial/modern enunciation and embark on a different level of enunciation that departs from the indigenous practices, distinctive terminology and unique, myriad locality. It equally fulfills the decolonial accent on “gnoseological and aesthetic reconstitution” to counter act the hegemonic colonial matrix of power that sets western epistemology and aesthetics as a universal measure to assess and appraise scholarly contribution (Mignolo 2021, 532-533). A family of intermingling traditions is identified as feeding the body of “literary theory” in Arabic which subsumes the following: poetry criticism; the study of eloquence and elucidation bayān; Qur’anic criticism and statement composition iʿjāz and naẓm; science of eloquence or Arabic rhetoric ʿilm al-balāgha; the philosophical tradition derived from the interpretation of Aristotle’s Poetics; and a system of aesthetics that formalized bayān as a distinctive science (Harb 2020a). What sets these strands apart from most of the available account is that she does not follow the nomenclature of medieval Latin sciences, focusing on wholly indigenous Arabo-Islamic fields of scholarly activity.

Harb’s approach that focalizes key notions and concepts and attempt to read the hermeneutical critical activity by critics and theorists on multiple fronts from the inside out is promising in foregrounding the indigenous conceptual continuities and shifts in Arabic poetics. Harb’s significant achievement lies in the centralization of an aesthetic theory of wonder in the Arabi-Islamic tradition. It is the aesthetic reconstitution, like Harb’s (2020a), in conjunction with epistemic reconstitution that should determine the nomenclature of the entire field whether it should be called Arabic, Islamic, Islamicate, Arabo-Islamic or Arabic-Islamic. The debates raging in northern academia on this matter demonstrates a wide rift that is left to the politics of dissemination to decide—such as: Druart (2003), Bäck (2008), Gutas (2018, 19-71), Kaukua (2020, 20-21). These discussions do not even take into account the indigenous discussions in Arabic-speaking on the same subject matter (al-Rubi 1984; el-Nagary 2007; al-Nashar 1995), to take only one example of one subaltern tradition affected by these politics of knowledge production. One reason ‘Arabic-Islamic’ may be preferrable is that it brings to the fore the whole spectrum of sciences and critical theories developed and refined from al-Kindī to Aḥmad al-Hilālī (d. 1175/1761)—the latter is reportedly among the later logicians who authored a substantial work on maʿānī wa bayān relevant to the investigation of Arabic-Islamic poetics (El-Rouayheb 2019, 248-250). An addition rationale would lie in breaking with the colonial belief that falsafā had an essentialist form in the Arabic-Islamic milieu that ended with Ibn Rushd or that poetics with balāgha culminated in the
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Arabic Aristotelianism of al-Qarṭājannī. Arabic language is at the heart of Arabic literary theory, yet Islamic philosophizing on poetics and aesthetics continued in Persian from as early as late fifth/eleventh century of which Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Rādūyānī’s *Tarjumān al-balāgha* has played an eminent role (Gould 2016, 339-371). Between the medieval/premodern, classical/postclassical, and new/old (Bauer 2007; 2018; Kaukua 2020; Harb 2020a), a decolonial Arabic-Islamic poetics would prioritize discussions on the terms of conversation that factor in the epistemic equity that should be sought, the geopolitical constitution of knowledge production and dissemination and the hindrances that stand against holding these dialogues.

Delinking Arabic-Islamic poetics from the body of theory requires adopting a critical hermeneutic that questions the assumptions and presuppositions brought by the knowing subject, their disciplinary backgrounds, and their cultural embeddedness on the object of study. Learning to unlearn the marginality of Arabic-Islamic poetics in anthologies and textbooks of literary theory further demands an enactment of an epistemic reconstruction of that tradition in its myriad manifestations. It is fallacious to argue that epistemic reconstruction is a novelty in Arabic-Islamic philosophy whether in the north or south (e.g., Ayyad 1967; Abbas 1973; Black 1990; Griffel 2021). What is specifically called upon here is a decolonial epistemic reconstruction that brackets and critiques western epistemology and ontology from the study of Arabic-Islamic philosophy. One facet of the colonial/modern intrusive notions upon Arabic-Islamic philosophy is that poetics, rhetoric, and dialectic belong to argumentation, literary criticism, or comparative literature. Poetics emerged within multiple scholarly traditions that defy this categorization. Taxonomically, its rational and actional character arguably makes it a distinct style of philosophizing and it continues to be the foundation for contemporary attempts to reconstruct an Arabic critical and/or literary theory (e.g., al Rubi 1984; Hammouda 2001; Harb 2020b). The proposed departure point is the Arabic-Islamic classification of sciences, which is a continuation of the notable drive in the 1980s and 1990s among scholars to situate Arabic-Islamic poetics in the overall structure of knowledge (Abbas 1983; Iraqi 1992; Heinrichs 1995). Classifications, as Germann (2015) contends, are inherently epistemological since their authors need to conceive epistemological criteria to homogenize knowledge. Taxonomies could guide the study of the disciplinary threads that converge in Arabic-Islamic poetics and help in reconstructing its epistemic structures. Noting that that these taxonomies have constantly evolved in more than a millennium of active scholarly input, this proposal is tentative. The epistemic taxonomy of Fārābī will be briefly engaged with here to outline this reconstructive trajectory.

In *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* ([1970] 1990) and *Ilḥās’ al-ʿUlūm* (1968), al-Fārābī puts forward a novel epistemic diairesis that arguably marks a milestone in the separation of Arabic-Islamic science and the late-antique Neoplatonist conceptualization. One of its exceptional qualities is that it introduces wholly indigenous Arabic-Islamic sciences into the hierarchy of knowledge as noted by multiple scholars (Mahdi 1973, 117-147; Abbas 1983, 87). Not only may have this classification contributed to the
wide engagement with the ancient Greek sciences in the rising falsafa tradition, but it may hint at a broader epistemic role for mutakallimīn and fuqahā’ in the indigenization and development of science/philosophy. Sciences, according to al-Fārābī’s Iḥṣā’ (1968), are commonly divided into five categories that cover further subdisciplines: language, logic, ‘ulūm al-ta’līm [the propaedeutic sciences], natural and divine sciences, political science along with al-fiqh (jurisprudence) and ‘ilm al-kalâm (53). Abū Naṣr’s subclassification of ‘ilm al-lisān foregrounds the study of alfāz, followed by an emphasis on the corrective role this science assumes pertaining to writing and reading and concluded by including “qawānīn al-ashʿār” [codes of poetry] among the subdisciplines covered by the science and craft of language (59). In relation to the status of logic “sinātu al-ma’nīq,” al-Fārābī (1968, 67) assertively claims in his second chapter that “tūṭi bi-al-jumla al-qawānīn al-latī sh’nuḥā an taqūmā al-ʿaqīl, wa tusddadu al-insān nahuwa tariq al-sawāb wa-nahuwa al-ḥaqq” [the craft of logic provides the laws that reform the mind, and guide humans towards the truth and verity]. By implication, ma’nīq is embedded in sciences, striving to fulfill this ethico-epistemic duty of guiding humans to truth. Both language and logic have clear corrective roles whether to the tongue or the intellect and obviously poetics is envisioned as part of logic while codes of composition, reading and poetry are linguistic. Language and logic are together at the forefront of sciences rather than metaphysics or logic only, a focal point that anticipates the post sixth/twelfth century trend of consolidating the status of linguistics and semantics in logic.

It could be argued that the taxonomy of sciences in Abū Naṣr’s Iḥṣā’ follows the historical emergences of sciences and crafts found in the second part al-Ḥurūf ([1970] 1990, 142-143). In Hurūf, the al-ṣanā’i’ al-‘āmmīya [common crafts], which includes rhetoric and poetics, predates the al-ṣanā’i’ al-qiyāsīyah [crafts] that includes the dialectical, the sophistical, the rhetorical, the poetical and finally the apodictic or al-‘ilm al-yaqīn (150-151). The rhetorical and poetical crafts are still a commonality between the common and syllogistic crafts, which signifies that they assume two epistemic roles in al-Fārābī’s taxonomy: educational in introducing imaginary/make-believe meanings to speech, and standardizing in ascertaining order in rhyme, composition, and articulation (142-144). Whether Abū Naṣr’s prioritization of the linguistic is historically-driven or not, Al-Fārābī’s concern with terms and signification could be observed in his short treatises on poetry. In his “Fī qawānīn ẓinā’at al-shu’ā’rā” (1953, 149-158), he states his aim in writing this treatise to affirm aqāwil [statements] and enumerate ma’an [meanings] that conform to what Arīstū proposed in his treatise on poetry. After classifying statements into declarative and non-declarative, he subdivides poetical, false declarative statements into two types: those which elicit listeners to recall a referent by association, or the statements that impacts listeners through imitation or similarity [muḥākāt] (1953, 150). Eventually, Abū Naṣr reflects on the bands of poets who choose to rely on tamthīlāt [analogies] in their poetry and those who rely on tashbihāt [similes] after delivering linguistic/logical exposition of his subject matter (152-3). From this brief example, the entwinement of the theoretical and practical in al-Fārābī’s conceptualization of poetics is hinted at. Poetical statements have a logical character, yet poets employ
them with different aims in mind and through varied technical tools, e.g., analogies or similes. The dual linguistic/logical constitution of poetics is evident which is usually underinvestigated in the relevant literature on Arabic-Islamic theory. Khaled El-Rouayeb (2019, 25), with regards to the later Arabic-Islamic development of logic, correlates the linguistic shift in logic starting with Abū Yaʿqūb al-Sakkākī (d. 626/1229) and al-Khaṭīb al-Qazwīní (d. 739/1338) to two reasons: the phenomenal rise of ‘ilm al-maʿānī wa l-bayān and the philosophical turn in Islamic theology effected by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) and Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233). These linguistic developments may have been partially made possible by the space al-Fārābī negotiated in his taxonomy for maʿānī, which arguably crowns an older, burgeoning linguistic tradition in the study of nahw and tafsīr feeding into poetics.

**Concluding Remarks**

The decolonial research agenda stands in contrast to the postcolonial one where the possibility of “eurocentric critiques of Eurocentrism,” in the words of Mignolo (2018, 151), is always an eventuality (Grosfoguel 2011). As investigated in this paper, the implications of postcolonial literary historiography, as represented by Young (2004), on studying longer periods of history that predate the emergence of the modern world is deeply problematic. Reflecting on enunciation decolonially could underscore how actors, knowledge production and dissemination institutions and languages play a role in establishing a hierarchy of knowledge where categories in the global north are deemed the standards by which subaltern knowledge systems are appraised. Taking into consideration the nahḍa and post-nahḍa projects of reading tradition, comprehensive attempts at reconstructing the Arabic-Islamic poetics in full without following the disciplinary boundaries of language, logic and philosophy remains needed.

In the context of Arabic poetics within the Arabi-Islamic tradition extending from eighth to the 21st century, periodization, literary theory chronicles and anthologies could actively become a part of the colonial matrix of power which maintains a hold grip on knowledge. Reclaiming enunciation through underscoring the constructedness and arbitrariness of literary historiography is mapped out as a contribution to delinking from the salient coloniality/modernity nexus underlying anthologizing non-western theory. In this a preliminary investigation, fostering a decolonial research agenda that seeks to aesthetically and epistemically reconstitute the destituted is recommended. Delinking subaltern localities from the Euro-American values and ideals as humanism, linear time and the regimes of sensing and knowing and the one-sided arbitrary determinations of nomenclature may be the best option for a future where planetary knowledge systems are on equal footing. Enacting “epistemic disobedience,” that flouts the arbitrary divides and disciplinary restrictions imposed upon Arabic-Islamic poetics, is no longer an option rather than an ontological imperative in face of the impending anthropogenic disasters. Dipesh Chakrabarty (2016, 377-397), the subaltern postcolonial historian, believes that the looming climate change catastrophe calls for a new ‘humanities’ for our time that
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asserts our presence as biosocial species where the Kantian borders between the moral/biological, humanities/biological, and physical sciences are transcended. This new ‘humanities’ has to be unequivocally decolonial.

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Endnotes

1. In the World Bank-commissioned report on postsecondary education around the globe, humanities are only mentioned once in the context of the G20 countries which are foregrounded as having “a somewhat more balanced distribution” between enrollments in the humanities, social sciences and education, on one hand, and STEM on the other, compared with the OECD countries (Arnhold and Bassett 2021, 17). With an emphasis on coping up with new technologies, emerging economies are implicitly urged to divest from investing in the humanities and direct more funding to STEM education. This drive is inseparable from the western subordination of the humanities to the applied practical sciences, which could be traced back to the northern Enlightenment as Mignolo (2005) notes elsewhere.

2. “To the degree that there is oedipalization,” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari declare in Anti-Oedipus, “it is due to colonization” (1983, 189). This declaration occurs in the context of contrasting western psychotherapy with the native medicine of the Ndembu people of Congo by which “oedipalization” represents the imposition of psychoanalysis on the “primitive,” psychosocial cures of the Natives (1983, 187-190). Ironically, Spivak attacks at length in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Deleuze and Guattari’s naïveté and troubling glosses over the epistemic violence of imperialism (1994, 74-104). Young’s brief mention of Deleuze and Guattari anticipates, nonetheless, the eventual integration of Deleuze and Guattari’s theories into postcolonial criticism despite Spivak’s critique (Bignall and Patton 2010, 3).

3. Since St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1323) identified advocates of the unicity of intellect thesis as Averroists in 1270 CE, debates raged all over Europe among theologians, Aristotelians and university masters that centered on Ibn Rushd’s conjecture of the eternity of the soul and the separability of the intellect from the body (Hasse 2007, 117-121). It is also noted that a new wave of Latin translation of Ibn Rushd’s commentaries emerged at the end of the middle ages after nearly a two hundred year pause. Compared with the fifteen Rushdian commentaries rendered in the middle ages, nineteen were added in this wave of translations (Hasse 2007 114-115). This wide reception of Ibn Rushd, in contrast to the dominance of Ibn Sīnā’s
philosophy in the Islamic East, supports the claim that the character of the Latin Averroes thought in the Latin West diverges from that in the East.


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